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Mortgages with interest rates that can change over 
thelifeofthe loan—variable rate mortgages (VRMs) — 
have been prohibited
1 in most of the United States 
since the 1930s. But this prohibition is counterpro-
ductive and unnecessary. Rather than encouraging 
homeownership, one of its main purposes, it dis-
courages it by denying borrowers features many 
would prefer to those of the traditional fixed rate 
mortgages (FRMs) —including lower interest rates. 
And the prohibition isn't needed to accomplish any-
thing else; borrowers could still get the benefits of 
FRMs without it. To really encourage homeowner-
ship, therefore, (and to reduce taxes, too) mortgage 
lenders throughout the U.S. should be authorized to 
offer variable rate mortgages. 
A Housing Goal 
Banning VRMs is one of many governmental actions 
aimed at least in part at the same goal: to assure 
adequate housing, particularly the opportunity for 
every American family to own a home. It's impossible 
to say just when housing opportunities achieved the 
status of a national goal. But that status was implied in 
both the Housing Act of 1949 and the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968. 
These acts and much other legislation reflect the 
view that our housing goal will not be achieved with-
out active government involvement in the housing 
market. There is good economic justification for 
such involvement if we assume that society as a whole 
benefits when individuals own their homes. Each in-
dividual's decision to buy a house is based on purely 
individual benefits, and the costs of homeownership 
will undoubtedly exceed the benefits for some 
people. If the gains to society from having one more 
homeowner would more than make up the differ-
ence, the government should intervene to encourage 
home purchases. 
Policymakers may or may not have been moti-
vated by this theoretical argument, but they have 
chosen to encourage individual homeownership and 
to do it by actively participating in the mortgage 
market. Perhaps they chose to help the mortgage 
market because it seemed to need help: half of all 
mortgage borrowers had to default during the Great 
Depression. Whatever the reason, policymakers 
created a host of regulations and agencies aimed at 
improving borrowers' credit terms
2—especially in-
terest rates. 
Most of these regulations and agencies were 
meant to keep interest rates low. Many state govern-
ments acted directly and placed ceilings on the rates 
lenders could charge on their home mortgage loans. 
The federal government took a more indirect route. 
Since the rates mortgage borrowers must pay are 
determined to some extent by what lenders must pay 
to get funds to lend, policymakers tried to reduce the 
cost of these funds and then let competition among 
lenders pass the reductions on to borrowers. The 
federal government thus set ceilings too, but on the 
interest banks and S&Ls could pay on their deposit 
liabilities. (These ceilings are popularly known as 
Regulation Q.) It also established a complicated 
'We are not using prohibited in a strict sense here; variable rate 
mortgages are rarely explicitly prohibited. But many states effectively 
prohibit them by outlawing increases in interest rates and/or payments 
over the life of mortgage contracts. 
2Credit terms include a long list of mortgage contract attributes 
such as interest charge, down payment, and contract length. This study 
concentrates on the magnitude and variability of interest charges over 
the life of the mortgage contract. 
1 maze of agencies to help move nondeposit funds from 
national money markets to the mortgage market. The 
Federal Home Loan Bank System, for instance, sells 
investors government agency bonds which get tax 
breaks, then lends the proceeds to S&Ls, usually 
at below-market rates. The Federal Housing Ad-
ministration insures lenders against loss on home 
mortgage loans. And the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, the Government National Mortgage 
Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation provide lenders with a secondary market 
for insured mortgage loans where they can get money 
quickly. 
While keeping interest rates low was obviously a 
primary concern of policymakers trying to encourage 
homeownership, it wasn't the only one. They be-
lieved that borrowers also would find mortgages 
more attractive if the rates they had to pay for them 
could not be changed. So both the federal govern-
ment and most state governments effectively pro-
hibited many of the financial firms they chartered 
from offering mortgages with variable interest charges. 
A Counterproductive Prohibition 
Unfortunately, however, this prohibition works 
against the nation's housing goal instead of for it, 
mainly because it makes homeownership less attrac-
tive for many people. Of course some borrowers 
prefer paying a fixed rate of interest on their mort-
gage loans, but others prefer the advantages they 
could get by accepting changeable rates—and those 
advantages are considerable. 
The most obvious advantage stems from the fact 
that rates that vary can move down as well as up, 
while fixed rates are just that—fixed. If, for example, 
the cost of funds to lenders fell unexpectedly, holders 
of VRMs would benefit: their interest rates would be 
reduced automatically. Holders of FRMs, however, 
could not take advantage of those lower rates without 
paying closing costs on a new mortgage and possibly 
prepayment penalties on their current one. 
This advantage of VRMs is greater than it may 
seem, for the need to pay the extra costs of refinanc-
ing a fixed rate mortgage would come at a bad time 
for most people. This is because changes in interest 
rates are linked to changes in inflation and income 
growth. 
Both lenders and borrowers make some predic-
tions of inflation when they make mortgage con-
tracts. Lenders set the interest rate based on what 
they think inflation will be over the life of the loan so 
that they'll be sure to get some real return for the use 
of their funds. Borrowers are willing to accept these 
interest rates because they expect inflation not only 
to reduce the real value of their mortgage payments 
but also to boost their income over the life of the loan 
so that they'll pay a shrinking share of their income 
for the mortgage. 
If inflation slowed unexpectedly, eventually pull-
ing down interest rates, lenders obviously wouldn't 
suffer from their wrong prediction, but some borrow-
ers would. The growth in their inflation-tied income 
would slow too, making them less able than they 
expected to afford anything with a fixed price-
including a mortgage. The ability to change the in-
terest rate on a mortgage would thus be a great advan-
tage. While people with VRMs would be able to pay 
less for their mortgage when they could afford less, 
people with FRMs would have to either pay more of 
their income than they expected for their mortgage 
or else pay extra refinancing costs when they could 
least afford them. 
One reason many have not recognized this ad-
vantage of VRMs is that since the mid-1960s lenders 
seem to have consistently underestimated inflation 
when they set FRM rates, which has, of course, given 
FRM borrowers the advantage. It's hard to believe 
lenders will make such mistakes much longer, but 
even if they made them occasionally, VRM borrow-
ers would not be as bad off as some may think. For if 
inflation rose faster than expected, pushing variable 
and new mortgage rates above those on old fixed-rate 
loans, income would rise faster than expected too. 
People with VRMs would therefore be paying higher 
rates when they were best able to afford them. 
Overall, VRM rates would be lower 
And over the life of the loan, VRM borrowers would 
come out ahead. For probably the most attractive 
feature of VRMs is the level of their interest rates 
compared to FRMs': they'd be lower. This is because 
making loans at fixed rates is much riskier for mort-
gage lenders. 
The increased risk comes from not being able to 
adjust loan rates to match changes in the cost of 
funds. Mortgage lenders rely mostly on short-term 
deposit liabilities, and the rate of interest they must 
pay for them varies quite a bit. By definition, how-
2  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1979 ever, the rate they charge on FRMs cannot change at 
all. While lenders try to predict what short-term rates 
will be over the life of the loan when they set fixed 
mortgage rates, the chances of being wrong are great. 
Thus lenders' profit—the margin between the cost of 
liabilities and the return on assets—can vary unpre-
dictably. 
It is, of course, the possibility of sharp drops in 
income resulting from unexpected jumps in short-
term interest rates which poses the greatest threat to 
mortgage lenders. Consider the implications of an 
unexpected 2 percentage point rise in short-term 
rates (not an unheard of jump) for an S&L holding 
$100 million in FRMs. If the rate paid on that firm's 
liabilities rose by the same amount, its profit for the 
year would suffer an unpredicted $2 million decline, 
most likely pushing it well into the red for the year 
and possibly into bankruptcy. 
But don't Regulation Q ceilings protect lenders 
from such dramatic shifts in the cost of funds? To 
some extent, yes, but that protection is mostly 
illusory. When interest rates on nondeposit short-
term liabilities such as commercial paper and U.S. 
Treasury securities rise above the ceiling for 
deposits, savers begin shifting funds out of deposits 
and into the more profitable investments. This 
process, called disintermediation, forces mortgage 
lenders to acquire liabilities not covered by interest 
rate ceilings, that is, to pay the higher costs of funds 
despite Regulation Q. For instance, banks and S&Ls 
can offer six-month, $10,000-plus savings certificates 
with interest rates tied to Treasury bill rates
3 and 
$100,000-plus certificates of deposit at rates they are 
free to choose. Furthermore, federally chartered 
thrifts, which specialize almost completely in long-
term mortgage lending and are thus especially vulner-
able to unexpected jumps in short-term interest rates, 
can borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank at 
rates which are typically below their market alterna-
tives but which may be far above Regulation Q ceil-
ings. So even with government agencies' help, Regu-
lation 0 does not effectively shield mortgage lenders 
from upward swings in short-term rates and the re-
sulting plunge in earnings. 
The increased risk of such plunges ultimately 
makes borrowers pay more for FRMs than they 
would have to for VRMs. That's because managers 
and resource owners are typically risk avoiders. An 
increase in the riskiness of mortgage lending leads 
them to shift resources out of mortgage loans and into 
less risky investments. As this occurs, potential bor-
rowers must compete for the dwindling supply of 
mortgage credit, and they do so by bidding up credit 
terms. In the end, rates on FRMs rise to a point where 
the payments borrowers are willing to make and so 
the expected return from mortgage lending are high 
enough to compensate managers and resource own-
ers for the added risk. Lenders obviously wouldn't 
need this kind of compensation on VRMs. In fact, if 
they were allowed, lenders would encourage borrow-
ers to choose VRMs by offering lower average charges 
on them over the life of the mortgage contract. 
Prohibiting VRMs does no good 
Attractive as these features are, some say, prohibiting 
VRMs is warranted to assure borrowers of the bene-
fits of FRMs. But this is simply not true. The prohibi-
tion is not only counterproductive, it is unnecessary. 
It does not give borrowers any benefits they would 
not be able to get without it. 
If VRMs were allowed, certainly FRMs would 
still be available to those who prefer fixed rates, and 
they would have to pay no more than if VRMs were 
still prohibited. There is no reason for lenders to offer 
VRMs exclusively if the return on FRMs is high 
enough to make them take the risk. And current 
FRM interest rates are obviously already high enough 
to do that, or mortgage money would be draining into 
less risky activities. 
A few policymakers seem to think that prohi-
biting VRMs is necessary to protect consumers from 
big business; indeed, some say this was a main reason 
for the prohibition. They argue that borrowers can't 
assess the likely course of interest rates as well as 
lenders, and lenders would take advantage of that if 
VRMs were allowed. 
We see at least three flaws in that line of reason-
ing. First, if borrowers have less information than 
lenders, that disadvantage exists when they're taking 
out FRMs too; prohibiting VRMs doesn't protect 
borrowers from lenders. Second, that protection isn't 
necessary anyway. While some borrowers may know 
less than lenders about future interest rate develop-
These instruments were first allowed in June 1978 as a result of 
disintermediation pressures. 
3 ments, individual lenders are unlikely to know more 
than other lenders. Competition for customers would 
therefore prevent lenders from taking advantage of 
their informational edge over borrowers in the setting 
of VRM terms just as it does now with FRM terms. 
And third, if VRMs were allowed, any borrowers who 
nevertheless felt at an informational disadvantage 
and that the disadvantage was in some sense more 
severe with VRMs could choose to take out FRMs. 
Of course the borrowers could underestimate their 
relative lack of information and take the wrong type 
of mortgage, but to prohibit what may often be the 
right choice because it isn't always the right choice 
seems a rather extreme application of consumer pro-
tectionism. 
Drop it—for everybody's sake 
The experience in California, one of the few states 
where VRMs have been explicitly authorized,
4 sup-
ports this analysis. Many borrowers there obviously 
find VRMs attractive. As of June 1978, they had 
taken $15 billion worth of them, about 40 percent of 
all mortgages held by lenders offering VRMs. And 
borrowers who prefer FRMs are not suffering as a 
result. While initial rates on all types of mortgages 
have risen nationwide since VRMs were allowed in 
California, rates on FRMs have not risen any more in 
that state than elsewhere. As expected, though, in 
California average rates on VRMs have been lower 
than those on FRMs. 
Dropping this counterproductive prohibition on 
VRMs nationwide would thus not cost borrowers 
anything, and it could benefit nearly everybody. 
Those people now happy with FRMs would lose 
nothing; they would still be able to get them and at no 
higher price. But people now accepting FRMs un-
happily or completely discouraged from homebuying 
by them would be able to get the kind of mortgages 
they'd prefer. If VRMs were allowed, therefore, more 
mortgages would be made, the government's housing 
goal would be promoted, and society as a whole could 
benefit. As a bonus, taxpayers would benefit too. If 
lenders could vary some mortgage rates to more 
closely match the cost of funds, their dependence on 
government agencies would be reduced—and so 
could the taxes that support these agencies. 
"California's state-chartered S&Ls have been offering VRMs since 
1975. Effective January 1979, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
authorized the state's federally chartered S&Ls to offer VRMs too. 
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